INTRODUCTION

This is the second REACH situation overview on the Mosul Crisis since operations to reclaim the city and surrounding areas started on 17 October in 2016. In order to highlight most recent trends in displacement this situation overview will focus on displacement trends following the renewed offensive from 29 December until mid-January, and the subsequent increase of returnees to East Mosul until 13 February 2017.

Since the last Mosul Crisis Overview in November, the entire Eastern Bank of Mosul is now controlled by Iraqi forces, while West Mosul remains under AG-control. Following an initial increase in displacement between 29 December and mid-January displacement numbers have reduced as the Eastern Bank has come under the control of Iraqi forces, resulting in a reduction of conflict levels and increase in access to assistance. In addition to continuing to support displaced population and the ongoing returns since mid-January, humanitarian and government agencies are now preparing for the potential displacement of up to an estimated 250,000 people from West Mosul once upcoming military operations begin.

While most residents of Mosul and surrounding areas stayed put during the military offensive, an estimated 33,200 families (199,200 individuals) have displaced as a result of the conflict. The vast majority of IDPs have come from Mosul district (79%), with smaller proportions from Hatra (11%) and Tilkaif (7%) districts. Of the families that displaced so far, roughly 77% currently remain displaced, living primarily in 10 emergency camps and sites situated in Hamdaniya (46%), Mosul (42%) and Sheikhhan (6%) districts. The remaining 23% have returned to their area of origin in East Mosul City or retaken villages.

The increase in returnees, especially since mid-January, to Mosul City and surrounding villages raises concerns of premature returns as security conditions remain volatile. In total, 46,278 IDPs have reportedly returned since
military operations began and an estimated 70% of which returned since 29 December 2016. As security concerns and access to basic services improve, further returnees are expected. While humanitarian and government agencies are identifying and responding to needs in recently retaken villages, neighbourhoods in East Mosul and emergency camps, needs remain especially heightened by a general lack of cash and livelihood opportunities in these areas.

Available data on the humanitarian condition in West Mosul – still under AG control – highlight worsening living conditions as primary trade routes have been cut and residents struggle to meet daily needs with limited to no livelihood opportunities in parallel to rising food prices. Little information is available on villages still under AG control, primarily West of Mosul, however it can be expected that the situation is similar to, if not worse, than those reported in West Mosul.

### DISPLACEMENT OVERVIEW

#### DISPLACEMENT PROFILE

In line with the previous Mosul Offensive Crisis Overview in November 2016, available demographic data indicate that the majority of the displaced population from Mosul and its surroundings are minors, both in and out of camp settings. Data collected on informal sites in January 2017 indicates that 63% of the population was under the age of 17 with more than 50% of these under the age of four. Only 32% of IDPs were reportedly between the ages of 18 and 59 with the remaining 6% over the age of 60. Similar ratios were reported across assessed emergency camps, with 57% of the displaced population reportedly under the age of 17 and 40% between the ages of 18 to 59.

The gender ratio of IDPs in and out of camps is relatively equal, with males representing 48–50% of the assessed population and females 50–52%. According to REACH data collected in four emergency camps, roughly 11% of the assessed households were headed by a female.

Due to the rapid nature of their displacement, and at times travel distances, most assessed IDPs reported bringing few belongings with them. Some assessed individuals reported bringing cash, though due to the general lack of liquidity in their areas of origin, the amounts carried were low; given estimates ranged between 7 - 43 USD.

A lack of identification papers remain a concern, limiting the freedom of movement, access to services and increasing the risk of arbitrary detention of those concerned. According to UNHCR, 84% of assessed IDP families from Ninewa reported missing some sort of documents such as birth certificates, identity documentation and marriage certificates. KIs reported that adults without the necessary identification papers were required to have someone vouch for them to access emergency camps and were generally subjected to longer screening processes. In general, IDPs indicated screening could range from several hours to 2 days.

#### DISPLACEMENT TRENDS

Since the last reporting period in November, there has been a significant shift in displacement trends as the number of returnees increased in parallel to a decrease of outward displacement. During this period, IDPs have reportedly mostly returned to camps, mostly located in the East, in Hamdaniya sub-district, followed by the South, in Qayara sub district. Only a small minority displaced from Mosul city to Nargizilia and Qaymawa in the North-East - roughly 420 families. These camps in the North-East also continued to receive smaller numbers of IDPs from Tilkaif City. Since mid-January, when the majority of the Eastern Bank came under the control of Iraqi forces, the number of IDPs has reduced as a result of the reduction of conflict levels in recaptured areas of Mosul and increase in access to assistance. This marked the start of the second phase, between mid-January – 13 February, during which there has been a significant increase in the number of returnees in parallel to a decrease in the number of IDP arrivals. Overall 7,713 families (46,278 individuals) have returned since October 2016, of which 64% have returned since mid-January.

During this period, IDPs have reportedly mostly returned from Hasansham/Khazer emergency camps to Gogjali and East Mosul City. Other returns have occurred from Qayyarah sub district to Nimrod sub district and villages elsewhere within the Qayyarah district; and from Qaymawa/Nargizilia to villages North of Mosul and Mosul City. WFP also reported cases of return to several villages outside Telafar which were retaken from AGs in January. This report was not able to confirm where IDPs returned from, nor the caseload of
Internal displacement has been ongoing in Mosul City since before military operations began in mid-October 2017. As Iraqi forces have retaken neighbourhoods in East Mosul, a common trend has been noted whereby IDPs displace from high-conflict neighbourhoods close to the frontline to neighbourhoods with improved security which are no longer under AG-control. In these cases IDPs tend to live with family and friends or in abandoned houses. In addition, displacement from the Western to Eastern bank has been reported as people attempt to escape from AG-controlled areas.

Little information is available on outward displacement from and returns to West of Mosul. According to KIs, there were reports of displacement from Tel Afar to Mosul City and westward towards Syria. However, the exact caseload and timeframe of these displacements remain unclear.

REMAIN, PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

According to the mayor of Mosul, as of 27 January 2017 approximately 885,000 people were living in the 75 neighbourhoods of eastern Mosul city, with UNHCR estimating that 10-15% of the neighbourhoods’ residents had left during operations to retake East Mosul. In addition a further 750,000 civilians are estimated to remain on the western bank of which nearby 50% are children.
Little information is available on remainees in West and East Mosul; however, according to data collected by REACH in early January 2017, primary reasons for remaining included an inability to displace and to protect personal property. As the situation in East Mosul has improved since the beginning of January, reduced security concerns are likely to be an additional reason for remaining in East Mosul. Recent developments in East Mosul have created additional pull factors for return, particularly from camps, further aided by push factors from the area of displacement. REACH camp profiling data reported that primary motivations for IDPs leaving their emergency camp environments were to access ‘better shelter’ (35%), be ‘closer to family’ (26%) and the cost of living/employment opportunities (25%). Additional push factors include a lack of freedom of movement inside the camps and a desire not to spend winter living in a tent. In tandem, pull factors to Mosul city and surrounding villages for returning IDPs included a reduction in conflict levels, the wish to access livelihoods and education, and to reunite with families and friends. During previous REACH assessments, KIs also reported the ownership and protection of property as a key pull factor.

In parallel, ongoing displacement primarily from Mosul City has continued due to conflict in a number of neighbourhoods close to the Tigris River along with a lack of basic services and livelihood opportunities across neighbourhoods in East Mosul. Despite access to markets, severe cash shortages and a lack of livelihoods have restricted civilians buying power, hindering access to food and other necessary commodities, leading to increased displacement - especially from East Mosul.

### Intentions of minority groups:

To inform on future intentions and displacement of four minority groups in Iraq, REACH collected in-depth data, between 14-19 January 2017 from 113 Christian, Yazidi, Turkman and Shabak IDPs living in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and six additional Key Informants (KIs). Most had been displaced between July and August 2014.

**Shabak IDPs:** Of all minority groups, the Shabak community appeared to be the most likely to return with key reported pull factors including a desire to be at home and not having to pay rent. In particular, Shabak IDPs who displaced in 2016 stated that the majority would return as soon as possible and in fact many have already returned to villages in the North. Shabak IDPs from 2014 reported that the majority intend to return but only once basic services and safety have been restored and movement between checkpoints are alleviated. Few Shabak IDPs reportedly intend to displace abroad, many lacking the finances to do so.

**Turkman and Yazidi IDPs:** Yazidi and Turkman KIs were more hesitant to return, highlighting that their primary concerns are the guarantee of safety and the return of basic services. Were these to be guaranteed, and IDPs to trust that their security was ensured, many would likely return. Yazidi KIs reported that many of their community would prefer to displace abroad were they given the choice to do so.

**Christian IDPs:** Christian participants and religious leaders reported a reluctance to return. Primary reported reasons was the loss of assets and a fear that they would face similar persecution in the future. Instead, many reported that were they to have the financial means to do so, they would displace abroad - preferably to Europe.

**IDP INTENTIONS**

Overall the majority of IDPs who displaced since the start of the Mosul Offensive in mid-October 2017 intend to displace elsewhere in upcoming months, primarily back to their area of origin. Of people living in emergency camps, on average 52% of respondents intend to relocate to another location in the next three months, 70% of which intend to return to their area of origin. The remainder wish to relocate to another Governorate. Qualitative data collected at the beginning of January 2017 suggested even more pronounced intentions to return, with KIs estimating that the majority of IDPs intend to return to their area of origin, primarily to Mosul City.

REACH data collected in villages North and South of Mosul highlighted that the local community reportedly had no intention of displacing elsewhere, while IDPs from surrounding villages which have not yet authorised returns reportedly intend to remain in the villages until they can return to their villages of origin. Lastly, assessed IDPs from Mosul City residing in villages reported that many of their group have already returned to Mosul city and primary reasons for not returning were damaged housing and the fear of returning.

Little information has been gathered on the current intentions of civilians and IDPs living in Mosul City. However, it can be expected that many residents in West Mosul will be forced to displace once military operations in the West of Mosul begin. In addition, some KIs reported that if livelihood opportunities do not improve, civilians may be forced to displace in order to access basic necessities such as food and water.

### SITUATION OVERVIEW AND NEEDS IN AND OUT OF CAMPS

#### IN MOSUL AND SURROUNDING VILLAGES

In Mosul and surrounding villages the primary concern is a lack of livelihood opportunities which has resulted in a severe lack of cash, which in turn hinders many from accessing basic household needs such as food.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>East Mosul</th>
<th>West Mosul</th>
<th>Retaken Villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security and Damage</td>
<td>• The security situation remains volatile, particularly in areas close to the Tigris river, due to the presence of Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) and security incidents.</td>
<td>• Damage levels are reportedly lower in the West bank than the East. Damage has occurred primarily in commercial/industrial sites, followed by housing and commercial sites.</td>
<td>• Damage levels vary across the villages, with some villages almost completely damaged (e.g. Khorsebad), while other report limited damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• UN Habitat reports that 862 sites were damaged in Mosul since August 2016, 375 of which were damaged between December and 31 January 2017. Most damaged reportedly occurred in East Mosul.</td>
<td>• However, West Mosul is likely to see intensified conflict and subsequent damage during the upcoming offensive in the West Bank.</td>
<td>• Security concerns remain highest in villages close to ongoing conflict or yet to be retaken from AGs (e.g. West of Mosul).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td>• Food markets have returned to East Mosul and are open to the public. Most NFIs and food items are available.</td>
<td>• A limited number of larger markets were reportedly available.</td>
<td>• Some markets have returned to many villages North/South of Mosul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• However a lack of financial resources hinders many civilians from accessing food through markets.</td>
<td>• A severe lack of income opportunities/cash hinders people’s ability to buy any available food.</td>
<td>• For many the primary barrier is a lack of cash and livelihoods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• There have been multiple food distributions.</td>
<td>• No humanitarian aid can access these areas.</td>
<td>• Food assistance has been received in many of the assessed villages, though gaps remain as some villages reported not receiving any assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reported coping mechanisms: Reducing food consumption and skipping meals.</td>
<td>• Commercially available stocks are dwindling and prices are almost double those in East Mosul. UN-Habitat found that 80% of essential food stuff is unavailable to civilians in West Mosul.</td>
<td>• Based on available information from villages in Nimrod sub district, food prices were generally average.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reports of many people suffering from injuries (as a result of conflict or displacement) and of people showing signs of trauma and psychosocial distress.</td>
<td>• Reported coping mechanisms: Reducing diet variety.</td>
<td>• An urgent need for food items and farming equipment were reported in assessed villages within the Qayara and Hamam All districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Primary concern is a lack of safe drinking water in eastern Mosul.</td>
<td>• Reports of child mortality and severe cases on malnutrition due to a lack of powdered milk formula and the scarcity of natural breast milk.</td>
<td>• Reported coping mechanisms: borrowing from families and friends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Trucksed drinking water is reportedly insufficient to meet local demand, underscoring the urgent need to restore damaged water networks.</td>
<td>• In addition, there were reports of well water contamination due to high levels of sulphur leakages from local septic tanks.</td>
<td>• Little information is available on the state of education in surrounding villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Many areas reported relying on unprotected boreholes/wells.</td>
<td>• In addition, there were reports of well water contamination due to high levels of sulphur leakages from local septic tanks.</td>
<td>• While REACH teams have observed the return of schools in assessed retaken villages, this report was not able to collect much additional information on the state of education in surrounding villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reports of limited functional solid waste management system.</td>
<td>• • Reports of some open hospitals and health clinics.</td>
<td>• Many villages do not have a health facility within the villages. Though hospitals are often accessible by car, many cannot afford the journey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods</td>
<td>• Available data for East/West Mosul and surrounding areas reported similar findings:</td>
<td>• Primary concern is a lack of safe drinking water in West Mosul.</td>
<td>• Many villages received health assistance, though KIs reported the need for specialised healthcare/medication especially for chronic diseases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• After more than two years under AG-control, access to livelihoods and cash remains limited across East and West Mosul, as well as the villages.</td>
<td>• Only one or two water treatment facilities working and reports that safe drinking water supplies is only sufficient for 40% of residents.</td>
<td>• People are reportedly going without medication in many cases as they cannot afford or access the medication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A lack of livelihoods is a primary barrier to accessing the most basic household needs, including food and healthcare.</td>
<td>• In addition, there were reports of well water contamination due to high levels of sulphur leakages from local septic tanks.</td>
<td>• Many villages have returned to many villages North/South of Mosul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The situation is further exacerbated by returnees who have started to arrive, many of whom have exhausted any remaining cash in their area of displacement.</td>
<td>• • Based on available information from villages in Nimrod sub district, food prices were generally average.</td>
<td>• For many the primary barrier is a lack of cash and livelihoods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Report Coping Mechanisms (East Mosul): Selling productive (tools, machines, livestock) and non-productive (radio, TV, personal belongings) assets, taking loans from banks, borrowing money from family and friends.</td>
<td>• • Based on available information from villages in Nimrod sub district, food prices were generally average.</td>
<td>• An urgent need for food items and farming equipment were reported in assessed villages within the Qayara and Hamam All districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFI</td>
<td>• Need for winterization NFIs: in particular fuel and kerosene, and blankets and mattresses.</td>
<td>• Limited access to kerosene was reported</td>
<td>• Need for winterization NFI, in particular fuel and kerosene.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reports of limited functional solid waste management system.</td>
<td>• Prices have reportedly increased eightfold, while the price of gas is fourteen times higher than in June 2014.</td>
<td>• Primarily barrier to accessing these items is a lack of cash. Reported prices for are higher than average, at 0.67 -1.47 USD per litre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>• Primary concern is a lack of safe drinking water in eastern Mosul.</td>
<td>• • Based on available information from villages in Nimrod sub district, food prices were generally average.</td>
<td>• Many villages do not have a health facility within the villages. Though hospitals are often accessible by car, many cannot afford the journey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Trucksed drinking water is reportedly insufficient to meet local demand, underscoring the urgent need to restore damaged water networks.</td>
<td>• Only one or two water treatment facilities working and reports that safe drinking water supplies is only sufficient for 40% of residents.</td>
<td>• Many villages received health assistance, though KIs reported the need for specialised healthcare/medication especially for chronic diseases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Many areas reported relying on unprotected boreholes/wells.</td>
<td>• In addition, there were reports of well water contamination due to high levels of sulphur leakages from local septic tanks.</td>
<td>• People are reportedly going without medication in many cases as they cannot afford or access the medication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reports of limited functional solid waste management system.</td>
<td>• • Based on available information from villages in Nimrod sub district, food prices were generally average.</td>
<td>• Many villages do not have a health facility within the villages. Though hospitals are often accessible by car, many cannot afford the journey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Some largely undamaged health facilities are reportedly available.</td>
<td>• Reports of some open hospitals and health clinics.</td>
<td>• Many villages received health assistance, though KIs reported the need for specialised healthcare/medication especially for chronic diseases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reports of many people suffering from injuries (as a result of conflict or displacement) and of people showing signs of trauma and psychosocial distress.</td>
<td>• However health services are reportedly expensive, medication is limited and services are generally only available to AGs.</td>
<td>• People are reportedly going without medication in many cases as they cannot afford or access the medication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>• There is a need for more ambulances to transport emergency cases and more trauma specialists to work in available health facilities.</td>
<td>• Reports of some open hospitals and health clinics.</td>
<td>• Many villages do not have a health facility within the villages. Though hospitals are often accessible by car, many cannot afford the journey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>• 30 primary and secondary schools have been re-opened in East Mosul.</td>
<td>• Little information is available on education in the West Bank. However the situation is likely to be similar to conditions reported early October when schools ran an AG-enforced curriculums and the vast majority of school aged children reportedly did not attend school.</td>
<td>• Many villages received health assistance, though KIs reported the need for specialised healthcare/medication especially for chronic diseases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Education Cluster has highlighted the need for minor repairs and the rehabilitation of additional schools in East Mosul.</td>
<td>• While REACH teams have observed the return of schools in assessed retaken villages, this report was not able to collect much additional information on the state of education in surrounding villages.</td>
<td>• People are reportedly going without medication in many cases as they cannot afford or access the medication.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Humanitarian conditions are most severe in West Mosul City and inaccessible villages which are either still under AG control, or close to ongoing conflict such as villages West of Mosul in the Tel Afar sub district. (See table 1 above for more information on needs in East and West Mosul and surrounding villages.)

As of 18 January, the government of Iraq announced that all neighbourhoods in East Mosul had been retaken from AGs, resulting in improved security conditions and greater access to humanitarian assistance. Large parts of the Eastern Bank have been damaged by the conflict, but plans are underway to restore water and power to retaken neighbourhoods. There are reports of limited Public Distribution System (PDS) distributions within the Eastern part of the city in addition to NFI, hygiene, health, food and shelter assistance. Regardless, significant needs remain, while the security situation remains volatile and there are concerns that returnees are occurring prematurely without adequate knowledge of the humanitarian condition in East Mosul.

The situation in West Mosul - reportedly hosting between 700,00093,750,00094 civilians - has deteriorated as primary trade routes have been cut, and bridges connecting the Eastern and Western Bank of Mosul have been destroyed. While certain conditions in villages North and South of Mosul have improved – such as greater access to markets – needs remain similar to those reported in November 2016. Needs remain highest in inaccessible villages which are either still under AG control, or close to ongoing conflict such as villages West of Mosul in the Tel Afar sub district.96

IN CAMPS

The majority (83%) of IDPs – roughly 125,910 individuals97 - from Mosul and surrounding areas currently live in 10 emergency camp and site settings.98 While service provision in emergency IDP camps has progressed since November 2016, especially with regards to access to basic services such as electricity, there is a continued need for winterisation non-food items (NFIs) such as kerosene and fuel, blankets, improved shelter conditions, access to education, cash and livelihood opportunities, as well as complaint and protection feedback mechanisms.99

Within the context of low temperatures throughout the winter and spring seasons, IDPs reported a particular need for shelter improvements and in particular fuel and kerosene.100 As many tents do not have a cement base, they are prone to flooding, as evidenced in January 2017 when torrential rains affected IDPs and service delivery in a number of camps and emergency sites and flooding was reported in Khazer MODM 101 and Qayyarah Airstrip emergency site.

KIs in IDP camps identified a lack of livelihoods opportunities and cash availability as primary barriers to purchase additional food and kerosene/fuel. Due to restriction on movement in and out of camps, IDPs have few opportunities to access cash. This is reportedly a primary push factor for leaving emergency camp settings.

According to NGO KIs, there is an urgent need for complaint mechanisms and adequate means to report on protection concerns in camps. Thus far protection teams have already identified cases of separated families in camps in addition to highlighting concerns regarding screening processes, especially of those suspected to have been involved with armed groups (AGs). Little information is available of what occurs to those who are held behind at screening centres, with Human Rights Watch reporting allegations of the torture of minors during detention.103

Despite improvement in access to education in camps, as of 29 January 2017, an estimated 69% of school aged children who had displaced from Mosul and surrounding areas did not have access to any form of education.104 According to the Education Cluster a shortage of textbooks continues to hamper the education response as there are insufficient textbooks to send to camps for formal learning programs.105

KEY INFORMATION GAPS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the secondary data available, the following key information gaps can be defined:

• Determining who are the most vulnerable in

East Mosul, the socio-economic makeup of East-Mosul neighbourhoods, and where are needs most severe.

• Population numbers, displacement trends and humanitarians needs West of Mosul City in the Tel Afar region, as well as in villages South-West of Mosul.

• In depth understanding of intentions to return by area of origin with regards to IDP populations in and out of camps.

The following recommended activities can be undertaken to close these gaps:

• Conduct inter-agency assessment to provide comparative neighbourhood-level data across all East Mosul, gathered within the same timeframe, that allow for robust sectoral prioritization at the neighbourhood level. Current ad hoc assessments - while providing essential information - do not use harmonized methodologies, timeframes and indicator frameworks, limiting the scope of potential cross-comparative analysis.

• Continued, coordinated monitoring of needs and humanitarian situation in West Mosul, harmonized with multisectoral indicators in use for East Mosul and the retaken villages.

• Coordinated, regularly updated information on needs in villages North and especially South-West and West of Mosul, harmonized with a multisectoral indicator framework to be used in Mosul City.
Endnotes:
1 For more information see: REACH, Mosul Offensive Crisis Overview, 25 November 2016
2 UNHCR, Flash Update, 8 February 2017
4 DTM, Mosul Portal, 13 February 2017
6 CCCM, Iraq: Mosul Operational Planning – Camps and Emergency Sites, 1 February 2017
7 According to UNHCR three people were killed and four injured during an attack in a recently retaken area of East Mosul. (UNHCR, Flash Update 2 February 2017) and the second week of February marked a noticeable increase in conflict levels in East Mosul.
9 IOM, factsheets #9 (17 October – 29 December) and #15 (17 October – 9 February)
10 REACH, Mosul Offensive Crisis Overview, 17 to 25 November 2016
11 UNHCR, Flash Update, 30 January - 5 February 2017
12 REACH camp profiling data, January 2017
13 Ibid.
14 REACH camp profiling assessed four emergency camps: Khazer MODM 1, Hasansham MODM 2, Hasansham UNHCR 3 and Qaynawa Camp.
15 REACH camp profiling data, January 2017
16 CCCM RASP and camp profiling data.
17 REACH camp profiling data, January 2017
18 REACH data collected in Hasansham M2, January 2017; Exchange rate based on: 1 USD =1,177 IQD
19 UNHCR, Flash Update, 30 January 2017
20 UNHCR, Mosul Weekly Protection Update, 28 January - 3 February 2017
21 REACH data collected early January 2017
22 UNHCR, Flash Update, 2 January 2017
23 IOM, Emergency Tracking Factsheet #9 (29 December 2016) and # 12 (19 January 2017)
24 UNHCR, Flash update, 17 January 2017
25 Due to fluctuating number in DTM as a result of ongoing returns in parallel to IDP arrivals, this report was not able to find exact numbers who displaced to each sub-district during this time.
26 Calculated on the basis of DTM figures between 29 December and 19 January. It is likely that this number is higher as this figure does not take into consideration IDPs that may have displaced and returned again during this period.
28 UNHCR, Flash Update, 19 January 2017
29 REACH rapid assessments throughout January and through KIs
30 WFP, mVAM bulletin #24, January 2017
31 REACH, Humanitarian Overview of Mosul City, October 2016
32 UNHCR, Flash Update, 30 January 2017
33 REACH data collected early January 2017 and UNHCR, Flash Update, 30 January 2017
34 OCHA, Sitrep 18, 22-29 Jan 2017
35 UNHCR, Flash Update, 30 January 2017
36 Save the Children, 350,000 children trapped and at risk in western Mosul as offensive enters more dangerous phase,30 January 2017
37 Since displacement began from East Mosul city, KIs reported that many families left one or two family members behind in order to protect their assets and property.
38 REACH data collected early January 2017
39 UNHCR, Flash update, 26 December 2017
40 UNHCR, Flash update, 30 January 2017
41 UNHCR, Flash Update, 6 February 2017
42 REACH camp profiling data and rapid assessments in January 2017.
44 REACH, Rapid Displacement Overview: Ibrahim Khalil, Al Adla, Kubaybah, Hamedya, Mikhtal, Al Jayf Villages. 25 January 2016
45 UN HABITAT, Mosul data & mapping portal: Physical Damage Assessment, 31 January 2017
46 Ibid.
47 REACH, Rapid Displacement Overview: Ibrahim Khalil, Al Adla, Kubaybah, Hamedya, Mikhtal, Al Jayf Villages. 25 January 2016
48 ACTED, Mosul Neighbourhood Snapshot: AUDN, Al Karamah, Al Intisar, Tahrir, Al Bakr, Al Akha, Al Zaahra 9 February
49 The majority of REACH KIs reported that IDPs arrived with little cash to emergency IDP Camps.
50 ACTED, Mosul Neighbourhood Snapshot: AUDN, Al Karamah, Al Intisar, Tahrir, Al Bakr, Al Akha, Al Zaahra 9 February
52 ACTED, Mosul Neighbourhood Snapshot: AUDN, Al Karamah, Al Intisar, Tahrir, Al Bakr, Al Akha, Al Zaahra 9 February
54 UNHCR, Flash Update, 8 February 2017
55 Based on remote data collected by REACH early January 2017
57 This was primarily due to disrupted supply chains and soaring prices.
59 Based on: PIN, Rapid Needs Assessments NIMROD, HAMDANIYA. 15 January 2015; REACH, Rapid Displacement Overview:Ibrahim Khalil, Al Adla, Kubaybah, Hamedya, Mikhtal, Al Jayf Villages. 25 January 2016; Zone 2, Mission report of Bybokh (8 December 2016), and Bybokh/Derij (12 December 2016)
60 REACH, Rapid Displacement Overview: Ibrahim Khalil, Al Adla, Kubaybah, Hamedya, Mikhtal, Al Jayf Villages. 25 January 2016
61 Based on data from villages in Nimrood sub district: REACH, Rapid Displacement Overview:Ibrahim Khalil, Al Adla, Kubaybah, Hamedya, Mikhtal, Al Jayf Villages. 25 January 2016
62 OCHA, Gogjali-Samar, Inter-cluster Mission Report, 10 January 2017
63 According to OCHA Situation Report, 6-12 February: Humanitarian partners are currently trucking 2,300 m³ of water per day.
64 OCHA, Gogjali-Samar, Inter-cluster Mission Report, 10 January 2017
65 ACTED, Mosul Neighbourhood Snapshot: AUDN, Al Karamah, Al Intisar, Tahrir, Al Bakr, Al Akha, Al Zaahraa
66 Resources and are in need of urgent assistance.
9 February
76 ACTED, Mosul Neighbourhood Snapshot: AUDN, Al Karamah, Al Intisar, Tahrir, Al Bakr, Al Akha, Al Zahraa 9 February
77 UN HABITAT, Rapid Situation Assessment: Living Conditions on the Right Bank of Mosul, 2 February 2017
78 Ibid.
79 REACH, Rapid Displacement Overview: Ibrahim Khalil, Al Adla, Kubaybah, Hamedya, Mikhlat, Al Jayf Villages. 25 January 2016 and Zone West needs gap analysis overview.
80 UNHCR Flash Update, 24 January 2016.
81 ACTED, Mosul Neighbourhood Snapshot: AUDN, Al Karamah, Al Intisar, Tahrir, Al Bakr, Al Akha, Al Zahraa 9 February
83 Based on remote data collected by REACH early January 2017
85 REACH, Rapid Displacement Overview: Rapid Displacement Overview: Ibrahim Khalil, Al Adla, Kubaybah, Hamedya, Mikhlat, Al Jayf Villages. 25 January 2016 and Zone West needs/gaps analysis.
86 UNHCR Flash Update, 24 January 2016.
87 REACH, Humanitarian Overview of Mosul City, October 2016
88 Reuters, Iraq special forces chief says mission accomplished in east Mosul, 18 January 2017
89 UN HABITAT, Mosul data & mapping portal: Physical Damage Assessment, 31 January 2017
90 UNHCR, Flash Updated, 28 December 2016
91 UNHCR, Flash Update, 30 January 2016
92 OCHA, Gogjali-Samar, Inter-cluster Mission Report, 10 January 2017
93 UNHCR, Flash Update, 5 February 2017
94 Save the children, 350,000 children trapped and at risk in western Mosul as offensive enters more dangerous phase, 30 Jan
95 WFP, mVAM bulletin #24, January 2017
96 Ibid.
98 CCCM, Iraq: Mosul Operational Planning – Camps and Emergency Sites, 1 February 2017
99 Based on: OCHA situation reports 19, UNHCR Flash updates and conversations with NGO KIs. See further down in text for specific documents cited.
100 OCHA, Iraq: Mosul Humanitarian Response, Situation Report No. 19, 30 January - 5 February 2017
101 UNHCR, Flash Update, 2 January 2017
102 UNHCR, Flash Update, 8 January 2017
103 Human Rights Watch, KRG: Children Allege Torture by Security Forces, 29 January 2017
104 Iraq Education Cluster, Mosul humanitarian response, Sitrep 29 Jan 2017
105 Iraq education cluster, Mosul humanitarian response, Sitrep 29 Jan 2017
106 Based on: OCHA situation reports 19, UNHCR Flash updates and conversations with NGO KIs. See further down in text for specific documents cited.
107 Education Cluster, Mosul Humanitarian Response Sitrep, 05. February, 2017
108 Iraq Education Cluster, Mosul humanitarian response, Sitrep 29 Jan 2017
109 About REACH Initiative
REACH facilitates the development of information tools and products that enhance the capacity of aid actors to make evidence-based decisions in emergency, recovery and development contexts. All REACH activities are conducted through inter-agency aid coordination mechanisms.

For more information, you can write to our in-country office: iraq@reach-initiative.org. You can view all our reports, maps and factsheets on our resource centre: reachresourcecentre.info, visit our website at reach-initiative.org, and follow us @REACH_info.